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Abstract: One of the limitation of continuous variable quantum key distribution is relatively
short transmission distance of secure keys. In order to overcome the limitation, some solutions
have been proposed such as reverse reconciliation, trusted noise concept, and non-Gaussian
operation. In this paper, we propose a protocol using photon subtraction at receiver which utilizes
synergy of the aforementioned properties. By simulations, we show performance of the proposed
protocol outperforms other conventional protocols. We also find the protocol is more efficient
in a practical case. Finally, we provide a guide for provisioning a system based on the protocol
through an analysis for noise from a channel.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of realistic applications of quantum technologies.
Technically, QKD provides shared secret keys between two remote parties, Alice and Bob.
Because of its nature of unconditional security, QKD has attracted broad research interest since
the first QKD protocol, the BB84 protocol, was invented in 1984 [1]. In early days, researches
about discrete variable QKD (DVQKD) had been actively conducted. After a while, continuous
variable QKD (CVQKD) encoding secret key information on continuous degree of freedom in
phase space of a quantum state started gaining interest triggered by the proposal by [2]. Unlike
DVQKD, CVQKD is beneficial to generate high secure key rates at short distances due to high
dimensionality of continuous variable, but it could not achieve key sharing over a long distance.
One of main hurdles of the limited distance is caused from low error correction efficiency at a long
distance under Gaussian based CVQKD protocols [3]. In order to overcome the hurdle, a variety
of ways in terms of post-processing are proposed such as post-selection [4], multi-dimensional
reconciliation [3], and reverse reconciliation [5]. Especially, the reverse reconciliation can
overcome fairly the limit by a simple way changing reference of error correction, which provides
importance of a receiver side in CVQKD protocols. There are also many proposals to modify a
quantum channel. Some proposals utilize amplifiers including noiseless amplifier [6–8], while
others change transmitter to use four-state or eight-state Gaussian states [9–11]. As another way
to increase distance, trusted noise concept is proposed, with which a noise added in a proper way
can increase security [12]. For example, noise added by a receiver, Bob, can increase security in
a CVQKD protocol with reverse reconciliation.
Deviated from Gaussian state protocols, non-Gaussian state protocols have been researched
due to its potential for high security in terms of secure key rate and distance [13–16]. One of
the representative non-Gaussian operation used in a CVQKD protocol is photon subtraction
implemented with a beam splitter and a photon counter. This shows that distance can be improved
with photon subtracted states.
In this paper, we propose a CVQKD protocol utilizing the aforementioned properties. Specifi-
cally, the protocol is a reverse reconciliation based CVQKD protocol adopting photon subtraction
operation in a receiver side. Through numerical simulations, we show the proposed protocol
outperforms a conventional CVQKD protocols. This result coincides with existed research results
showing positive potentials of non-Gaussian state and trusted noise in terms of security, which
convinces our approach is quite reasonable.
The paper is organized as we introduces a target system model in Section II. A secure key rate
based on the model is obtained in Section III. Section IV provides numerical simulations for
secure key rates under the model. We finalize in Section V with some concluding remarks.
2. System Model
In this section, we introduce a system model for a CVQKD protocol with photon subtraction at
a receiver, Bob, as shown in Fig. 1. Here, a transmitter, Alice prepares a two mode squeezed
vacuum (TMSV) state |ψ〉AB0 which is an entangled state in a continuous variable domain.
|ψ〉AB0 =
∞∑
n=0
αn |n, n〉AB0, (1)
Fig. 1. A model for CVQKD with photon subtraction under a collective attack. HOM and
QM stand for homodyne detection and quantum memory, respectively.
where
αn =
√
α2n(
1 + α2
)n+1 , (2)
α2 and |n〉 represent mean photon number and number state, respectively.
In this model, we assume a collective attack where an Eve’s initial state is prepared as a TMSV
state |ψ〉E0F . In a similar to |ψ〉AB0 , |ψ〉E0F can be expressed with a mean photon number of
noise from a channel, β2.
|ψ〉E0F =
∞∑
m=0
βm |m,m〉E0F, (3)
where
βm =
√
β2m(
1 + β2
)m+1 (4)
After preparing |ψ〉AB0 , she transmits a quantum state ρB0 = TrA
( |ψ〉 〈ψ |AB0 ) of |ψ〉AB0 to Bob
through a quantum channel, while the other quantum state ρA = TrB0
( |ψ〉 〈ψ |AB0 ) is kept a
quantum memory. The transmitted ρB0 is mixed with an Eve’s state ρE0 = TrF
( |ψ〉 〈ψ |E0F ) in
the channel which can be modeled as a beam splitter with transmittance T .
Before finding a quantum state after a channel, we first look into a principle of a beam splitter.
Assume there is a beam splitter characterized transmittance T , where there are two input creation
operators iˆ†1 , iˆ
†
2 and two output creation operators oˆ
†
1, oˆ
†
2. In this setup, output operators can be
expressed based on the input operators as follows:
oˆ†1 =
√
Tiˆ†1 +
√
1 − Tiˆ†2, (5)
oˆ†2 =
√
Tiˆ†2 −
√
1 − Tiˆ†1 . (6)
By rearranging the above equations,
iˆ†1 =
√
Toˆ†1 −
√
1 − Toˆ†2, (7)
iˆ†2 =
√
Toˆ†2 +
√
1 − Toˆ†1 . (8)
Now, we can find a quantum state after a channel |ψ〉AB1EF based on the initial states of Alice
and Eve by applying a beam splitter operation on them.
|ψ〉AB0E0FB1E =
∞∑
n=0
αn |n, n〉AB0
∞∑
m=0
βm |m,m〉E0F |0, 0〉B1E , (9)
=
∞∑
n=0
αn
(
bˆ†0
)n
√
n!
|n, 0〉AB0
∞∑
m=0
βm
(
eˆ†0
)n
√
m!
|0,m〉E0F |0, 0〉B1E , (10)
=
∞∑
n=0
αn
(√
Tbˆ†1 −
√
1 − Teˆ†
)n
√
n!
|n, 0〉AB0 (11)
=
∞∑
n=0
αn
n∑
k=0
(−1)k
√(
n
k
) (√
T
)n−k (√
1 − T
)k
|n, 0〉AB0 (12)
⊗
∞∑
m=0
βm
m∑
l=0
√(
m
l
) (√
T
)m−l (√
1 − T
) l√(n − k + l
l
)√(
k + m − l
k
)
|0,m〉E0F |n − k + l, k + m − l〉B1E ,
where aˆ† indicates a creation operator of a quantum state ρA. Eq. (10) comes from a relation
between a number state and a creation operator such that aˆ† |n〉 = √n + 1 |n + 1〉. A beam splitter
operation results in Eq. (11). We can easily obtain |ψ〉AB1EF by tracing out and rearranging|ψ〉AB0E0FB1E .
|ψ〉AB1EF =
∞∑
n=0
αn
n∑
k=0
(−1)kγTn,k
∞∑
m=0
βm
m∑
l=0
γTm,lζn,k,m,l |n, n − k + l, k + m − l,m〉AB1EF ,
(13)
where
γTn,k =
√(
n
k
) (√
T
)n−k (√
1 − T
)k
, (14)
ζn,k,m,l =
√(
n − k + l
l
)√(
k + m − l
k
)
. (15)
In a similar way, a quantum state after photon subtraction represented as a beam splitter with
transmittance T1 |ψ〉AB2EFC can be obtained as follows:
|ψ〉AB2EFC =
∞∑
n=0
αn
n∑
k=0
(−1)kγTn,k
∞∑
m=0
βm
m∑
l=0
γTm,lζn,k,m,l
n−k+l∑
s=0
(−1)sγT1
n−k+l,s (16)
|n, n − k + l − s, k + m − l,m, s〉AB2EFC .
For easy understanding, we first analyze single photon subtracted case corresponding to C is a
single photon state. Then, the photon subtracted state |ψ〉 〈ψ |PSAB2EF = TrC
(
|ψ〉 〈ψ |PSAB2EFC |s=1
)
has the following expression.
|ψ〉PSAB2EF = −
1√
P1
∞∑
n=0
αn
n∑
k=0
(−1)kγTn,k
∞∑
m=0
βm
m∑
l=0
γTm,lζn,k,m,lγ
T1
n−k+l,1 (17)
|n, n − k + l − 1, k + m − l,m〉AB2EF ,
Fig. 2. A model for CVQKD substituting photon subtraction to a Gaussian unitary operation
resulting in the same covariance under a collective attack.
where P1 refers a normalization parameter defined as a probability that C is in a single photon
state.
P1 = 〈ψ |ψ〉PSAB2EF (18)
=
∞∑
n=0
α2n
n∑
k=0
∞∑
m=0
β2m
m∑
l=0
(
J+(n,k,m,l),(n,k,m,l) + J
−
(n,k,m,l)(n,k,m,l)
)
, (19)
where
J+(n1,k1,m1,l1)(n2,k2,m2,l2) = (20)
min{n2−k2,m2−l2 }∑
j=0
(−1)jγTn1,k1γTn2,k2+jγTm1,l1γTm2,l2+jζn1,k1,m1,l1 ζn2,k2+j,m2,l2+jγ
T1
n1−k1+l1,1γ
T1
n2−k2+l2,1,
J−(n1,k1,m1,l1)(n2,k2,m2,l2) = (21)
min{k2,l2 }∑
j=1
(−1)jγTn1,k1γTn2,k2−jγTm1,l1γTm2,l2−jζn1,k1,m1,l1 ζn2,k2−j,m2,l2−jγ
T1
n1−k1+l1,1γ
T1
n2−k2+l2,1.
Finally, we obtain a whole quantum state after photon subtraction |ψ〉PSAB2EF which is not a
Gaussian state anymore. Then, |ψ〉PSAB2EF is measured by a homodyne detector with respect to q
or p quadrature. After a choice of the quadrature is publicly announced to Alice, the kept ρA
in a quantum memory is measured by homodyne detector with respect to the quadrature. In
succession, Alice and Bob perform reverse reconciliation and privacy amplification to generate
final secure keys.
3. Secure key rate
In this section, we calculate secure key rate under our system model. Under a collective attack,
secure key rate K can be calculated as follows:
K = P1 {βI(A : B2) − χ(B2 : EF)} , (22)
where β is reconciliation efficiency. Here, I(A : B2) represents mutual information between Alice
and Bob, while χ(B2 : EF) refers the Holevo information defined as the maximum information
extracted by Eve from Bob’s data. Calculating I(A : B2) and χ(B2 : EF) starts from a photon
subtracted state with a density matrix ρPS
AB2EF
= |ψ〉 〈ψ |PSAB2EF . In case of χ(B2 : EF), it can be
calculated by
χ(B2 : EF) = S(ρPSEF ) − S(ρPSEF |B2 ), (23)
= −
∑
i
λEFi log2 λ
EF
i +
∑
i
λ
EF |B2
i log2 λ
EF |B2
i , (24)
where S(·) represents von Neumann entropy. Here, a density matrix for an Eve’s state is denoted
as ρPSEF having eigenvalues {λEFi }, while a density matrix for an Eve’s state given Bob’s
measurement on B2 is represented as ρPSEF |B2 with eigenvalues {λ
EF |B2
i }. Note that there are
infinite number of {λEFi } and {λEF |B2i } due to infinite dimension of ρPSEF and ρPSEF |B2 . Therefore,
infinite eigenvalues and their infinite sum make calculation of χ(B2 : EF) intractable.
If we remove one of the two calculations, the intractability of χ(B2 : EF) can be improved.
Removing calculation of infinite eigenvalues can be done if all states are Gaussian states because
S(·) of a Gaussian state can be calculated based on its covariance matrix having finite dimension.
In order to do that, we substitute photon subtraction operation to a Gaussian unitary operation
making the same covariance matrix with ΓPS
AB2EF
of ρPS
AB2EF
as in Fig. 2. This provides a lower
bound of the original protocol in terms of performance by the theorem of Gaussian optimality [17].
Define a state made by the Gaussian unitary operation as ρG
AB2EF
with ΓG
AB2EF
= ΓPS
AB2EF
. Then,
by the theorem,
K ≥ P1 {βIG(A : B2) − χG(B2 : EF)} , (25)
where IG(A : B2) and χG(B2 : EF) represent mutual information between Alice and Bob and
the Holevo information obtained from ρG
AB2EF
, respectively. Since ρG
AB2EF
is a Gaussian state,
IG(A : B2) and χG(B2 : EF) can be easily obtained from a covariance matrix of ΓGAB2EF .
In order to calculate ΓPS
AB2EF
, we first look into a structure of a covariance matrix. Define a
operator vector xˆ as follows:
xˆ = (qˆ1, pˆ1, ..., qˆN, pˆN )> , (26)
where qˆi and pˆi are quadrature operators of the i-th mode out of N modes. Then, an element of a
covariance matrix Γ is defined as
Γi j =
1
2
〈∆xˆi∆xˆj + ∆xˆj∆xˆi〉 , (27)
where ∆xˆi := xˆi − 〈xˆi〉. In general, Γi j indicates a correlation between modes i and j, while a
diagonal element Γii indicates a variance of a mode i. From now on, for easy understanding, we
substitute Γii and Γi j to Vi and Ci j , respectively.
Since ρG
AB2EF
is a Gaussian state, IG(A : B2) is calculated as follows:
IG(A : B2) = 12 log2
VB2
VB2 |A
, (28)
where VB2 |A is a conditional variance of Bob’s data given Alice’s data. Since q and p quadrature
operators are independent and symmetric in terms of probability distribution, VB2 is invariant
with respect to the quadratures.
VB2 =
1
2
〈∆qˆB2∆qˆB2 + ∆qˆB2∆qˆB2〉 , (29)
= 〈ψ |1 + 2bˆ†2bˆ2 |ψ〉
PS
AB2EF
, (30)
= 1 +
2
P1
∞∑
n=0
α2n
n∑
k=0
∞∑
m=0
β2m
m∑
l=0
(n − k + l − 1)
(
J+(n,k,m,l),(n,k,m,l) + J
−
(n,k,m,l)(n,k,m,l)
)
(31)
× u(n − k + l − 1),
where u(·) is a step function defined as
u(x) =
{
1, if x ≥ 1
0, otherwise.
(32)
The second equality holds since 〈qˆB2〉 = 0 and the relations that qˆ = bˆ†2 + bˆ2 and bˆ2bˆ†2 − bˆ†2bˆ2 = 1.
In case of VB2 |A where B2 given A follows a Gaussian distribution, this can be obtained as
follows:
VB2 |A = VB2 −
CAB2
VA
, (33)
where
VA = 1 +
2
P1
∞∑
n=0
α2n
n∑
k=0
∞∑
m=0
β2m
m∑
l=0
n
(
J+(n,k,m,l),(n,k,m,l) + J
−
(n,k,m,l)(n,k,m,l)
)
, (34)
and
CAB2 =
1
2
〈∆qˆA∆qˆB2 + ∆qˆB2∆qˆA〉 , (35)
=
2
P1
∞∑
n=0
αnαn+1
n∑
k=0
∞∑
m=0
β2m
m∑
l=0
√
n + 1
√
n − k + l (36)
×
(
J+(n,k,m,l),(n+1,k,m,l) + J
−
(n,k,m,l)(n+1,k,m,l)
)
.
In the case of Eve’s information, for a Gaussian state, the Holevo information becomes
χG(B2 : EF) =
∑
i
g(vEFi ) −
∑
j
g(vEF |B2j ), (37)
where
g(x) =
(
x + 1
2
)
log2
(
x + 1
2
)
−
(
x − 1
2
)
log2
(
x − 1
2
)
(38)
Here, vEFi and v
EF |B2
j indicate an i-th symplectic eigenvalue of a covariance matrix for Eve’s
state ΓGEF and a j-th symplectic eigenvalue of a covariance matrix for Eve’s state given Bob’s
measurement ΓG
EF |B2 , respectively. Specifically, v
EF
i and v
EF |B2
i are calculated as absolute
eigenvalues of
√−1ΩΓGEF and
√−1ΩΓG
EF |B2 , where Ω =
⊕N
i=1
[
0 1
−1 0
]
. For the symplectic
eigenvalues, it is required to find structures of ΓGEF and Γ
G
EF |B2 , which are obtained from Γ
G
EFB2
.
Elements of ΓGEFB2 can be directly calculated by using Eq. (27), which provides the following
form.
ΓGEFB2 =
[
ΓGEF LEFB2
LEFB2 ΓGB2
]
, (39)
where
ΓGEF =
[
VEI2 CEFσz
CEFσz VFI2
]
, (40)
LEFB2 =
[
CEB2I2
CFB2σz
]
, (41)
where I2 and σz represent two dimensional identity matrix and pauli z operator, respectively.
ΓGEF is directly obtained from Γ
G
EFB2
, while ΓG
EF |B2 is obtained from it by using the following
relation [18].
ΓGEF |B2 = Γ
G
EF − LEFB2
(
ΠΓGB2Π
)MP
L>EFB2, (42)
where MP refers Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse.
Note that Eve can also perform a Gaussian operation on her states as shown in Fig. 2 to obtain
a Gaussian state with ΓPSEFB2 because Bob performs a Gaussian operation for substituting photon
subtraction. Based on this, elements of the covariance matrix in Eq. (40) are as follows:
VE = 1 +
2
P1
∞∑
n=0
α2n
n∑
k=0
∞∑
m=0
β2m
m∑
l=0
(k + m − l)
(
J+(n,k,m,l),(n,k,m,l) + J
−
(n,k,m,l)(n,k,m,l)
)
, (43)
VF = 1 +
2
P1
∞∑
n=0
α2n
n∑
k=0
∞∑
m=0
β2m
m∑
l=0
m
(
J+(n,k,m,l),(n,k,m,l) + J
−
(n,k,m,l)(n,k,m,l)
)
, (44)
CEF =
2
P1
∞∑
n=0
α2n
n∑
k=0
∞∑
m=0
βmβm+1
m∑
l=0
√
m + 1
√
k + m − l + 1 (45)
×
(
J+(n,k,m,l),(n,k,m+1,l) + J
−
(n,k,m,l)(n,k,m+1,l)
)
,
CEB2 =
2
P1
∞∑
n=0
α2n
n∑
k=0
∞∑
m=0
β2m
m∑
l=0
√
n − k + l
√
k + m − l (46)
×
(
J+(n,k,m,l),(n,k,m,l+1) + J
−
(n,k,m,l)(n,k,m,l+1)
)
,
CFB2 =
2
P1
∞∑
n=0
α2n
n∑
k=0
∞∑
m=0
βmβm+1
m∑
l=0
√
m + 1
√
n − k + l (47)
×
(
J+(n,k,m,l),(n,k,m+1,l+1) + J
−
(n,k,m,l)(n,k,m+1,l+1)
)
.
Eqs. (37) and (39) based on the above equations provide the corresponding Holevo information.
The aforementioned analysis deals with one photon subtraction case. In a similar way,
general photon subtraction cases are also analyzed by adjusting the summation of s in Eq. (16).
Furthermore, instead of a photon counter for photon subtraction, a photon detector case can also
be analyzed. This case is analyzed by summing s from 1 to∞ in Eq. (16).
|ψ〉AB2EFC =
∞∑
n=0
αn
n∑
k=0
(−1)kγTn,k
∞∑
m=0
βm
m∑
l=0
γTm,lζn,k,m,l
n−k+l∑
s=1
(−1)sγT1
n−k+l,s (48)
|n, n − k + l − s, k + m − l,m, s〉AB2EFC .
4. Simulation results
In this section, we perform three simulations. In order to check feasibility of the proposed protocol,
we compare the performances of the cases for photon detector and photon counter. Based on the
results of the first simulation, we compare the performance of the proposed protocol with other
conventional protocols. Finally, we simulate the maximum transmission distances for protocols
with respect to mean photon number of noise from a channel to analyze an effective region of the
proposed protocol.
The proposed protocol is initially based on a photon counter for photon subtraction. However,
a sophisticated photon counter is hard to implement and expensive. On the other hand, a photon
detector with no photon number resolution is relatively easy to implement and costs lower. For a
more practical analysis, we compare two cases for a photon counter and a photon detector used in
photon subtraction. Here, a photon counter case corresponds to a case for one photon subtraction
case. We set error correction efficiency f , detector efficiency, mean photon number of noise
from a channel β2, and transmittance T1 of the beam splitter of Bob as 0.95, 0.68, 0.001, and
Fig. 3. Comparisons for secure key rate depending on devices used for photon subtraction.
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portion of the summations by setting infinity to 30 in the summations. The corresponding results
are shown in Fig. 3. The blue and red lines indicate cases for photon counter and photon detector,
respectively. From the results, we can identify a photon detector case is slightly more secure than
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Fig. 5. Comparisons for the maximum transmission distance with respect to mean photon
number of noise from a channel depending on CVQKD protocols.
that of a photon counter. This provides the proposed protocol is rather more secure even for a
practical case. Furthermore, similar trend in the results means one photon subtraction occupies a
dominant part of the performance in a photon detector case.
Next, we conduct performance comparisons between the proposed protocol with a photon
detector and other conventional protocols. Here, we set simulation parameters as the same as the
first simulation. For performance comparison, we simulate secure key rates of a conventional
CVQKD corresponding a CVQKD without photon subtraction and a CVQKD proposed in [19]
where the trusted noise concept is used for better security. The corresponding results are plotted
in Fig. 4 where mean photon number of Alice for each protocol is optimized. Red, green, and
blue lines indicate a conventional CVQKD, a CVQKD with trusted noise, and the proposed
protocol, respectively. From the results, we find that our proposed protocol can transmit secure
keys at a longer distance. This yields that a combination of reverse reconciliation, the trusted
noise concept, and non-Gaussian operation shows positive synergy in terms of security than that
using partial properties.
Finally, we conduct simulations for the maximum transmission distances for the protocols
with respect to mean photon number of noise from a channel β2. Here, the maximum distance is
defined as the maximum distance with a positive secure key rate. Simulation parameters are the
same as in the aforementioned simulations. As shown results in Fig. 5, performance improvement
of the proposed protocol decreases as β2 increases, which means performance improvement of
the proposed protocol is bounded in a certain channel noise region. Based on this as a guide for
system provisioning, we utilize the proposed protocol depending on conditions of a system.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate how to improve secure distance of CVQKD. We utilize three
properties of non-Gaussian state in terms of security, reverse reconciliation, and trusted noise
concept to come up with a reverse reconciliation based CVQKD protocol with a photon subtracted
states at a receiver. In order to overcome intractability of a calculation for secure key rate, we
utilize the Gaussian optimality theorem, which yields a lower bound of secure key rate under the
proposed protocol. Through simulation results, we find that the proposed protocol can improve
secure distance. The proposed protocol also outperforms even for a practical case where a photon
detector instead of a photon counter is used. The results convince that a combination of the
properties shows positive synergy in terms of security. Furthermore, we find an effective region
where the proposed protocol outperforms so that this provides a guide for provisioning of a
CVQKD system based on the proposed protocol.
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